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ABSTRACT: Nature disasters which embraced European subcontinent in the last 
two years had a mobilizing impact on civil society’s organizations, and in particu-
lar on Russian social movements and its SMOs. Basing on the empirical research 
of forests and step fires as well as of the ice rains in some countries of the EU and 
the European part of Russia, the paper presents a detailed analysis of mobilizing 
effect of natural disasters on rescue operations implemented by civil activists, the 
framing of their activity by the SMOs’ leaders, changing disposition of forces in-
volved in these operations, and on the emergence of new initiative groups and 
building new networks. The growing potential of civil society organizations to 
play the role of ‘programmers’ and ‘switchers’ of the rescue networks is analyzed 
as well. Three phases of activity of civil society actors are investigated: The prepa-
ratory phase to a disaster; their activity during it; and their role in the phase of re-
habilitation of nature ecosystems and human communities. A special attention will 
be given to the building of ad hoc virtual communities (sites, forums) by con-
cerned people who lived far beyond the affected areas, to mobilization of transna-
tional networks with sister organizations, and to the mobilization activity of the 
movement’s leaders. The shift from nature protection movement toward the de-
fense of basic human rights, from national to international networking, and by 
means of it the accumulation of social capital by individual activists and SMOs, 
the building of shared master frames of forthcoming climatic changes and mobiliz-
ing international support to cope with disasters and its consequences are of a no 
less importance. In conclusion, I’d analyze the dual social effect of a nature disas-
ter. On the one hand, it activates national SMOs and other civil units, stimulates 
the process of refining their social and political technologies as well as gives the 
impetus to the reconstruction of public sphere. On the other hand, such disasters, 
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1. Introduction 
Not only science, as many social scientists stated, but the very nature are the 
creators of new, emergent problems in human interaction with nature. On the 
other hand, the relationships between state and civil society rescuers shifted 
in favor of latter, especially if they learned to use internet and other IT de-
vises. 
It is often argued in political and academic circles both in domestic and 
abroad that Russian civil society is going to an end. It is not true. This socie-
ty had existed even in totalitarian era, but in the overt and dispersed form. 
Nor it extinguished in 2000s. The article examines the changing role and 
structure of Russian social movements (SMs) under conditions of huge natu-
ral disaster. I mean summer fires of 2010 which embraced the territory of 
Russia comparable with that of the EU. It has been a challenge not only to 
environmental but to many other social movements and charity organizations 
and grassroots. The disaster revealed a true disposition of forces in relation 
to the disaster and showed the actual role played by civil society at large and 
social movements in particular in mitigation of this eco-catastrophe. Section 
1 examines theoretical background for ‘disaster-civil society’ relationships. 
Section 2 analyses three main phases of an SM mobilization: usual, targeted 
and critical. In the next Section I consider the issue of framing the disaster 
by SMs and they changing structure and action repertoire accordingly. Sec-
tion 4 counts the major positive effects of civil society mobilization, and in 
Conclusion some general outcomes of this mobilization as well as a set of 
methodological issues of analyzing it are considered.   
 
2. Theoretical background 
The conceptual framework for our field research is based on a set types of 
sociological thought. Firstly, it was based on theorization of classical sociol-
ogy (see Weber, 1995; Marx, 1967; Sorokin, 2003) on the state of emergen-
cy of a society as it is and in particular of the impact of natural and man-
made disasters on human nature, human behavior and social order. I see the 
Sorokin’s idea of  negative selection is central here (Sorokin, 2003). Second-
 105 
 
ly, my conceptual framework based on the concepts of civil societies and its 
social capital in modern risk society (Beck, 1992; Yanitsky, 2000). Distribu-
tion of ‘bads’ becomes as important for society as the distribution of goods’. 
“Beck contends that now the ‘latency phase of risk threats is coming to an 
end. The invisible hazards are becoming visible” (Beck, cite by: Murphy, 
2010: 13). 
It should be stressed that in my view, the Beck’s and others risk society con-
cepts are insufficient in relation to Russian recent condition. But before, I 
must say that I fully agree with Murphy who argued ‘that sociology and a 
large part of social sciences had, however, ignored and abstracted out an 
important set of contextual influences on social and cultural life. It had, to 
use its own “bracketed”, and  language, “put in parentheses,” and “sus-
pended” the effects of the biophysical context. That was a mistake because 
humans are beings embedded in biophysical dynamics’ (Murphy, 2010: 
342). 
Therefore, I introduced the concept of all-embracing risk society (Yanitsky, 
2000, 2010). The concept of ‘normality of catastrophe in modern society 
introduced by Ch. Perrow (1984) is of principled importance as well. As he 
argued, ‘we acted in terms of our own designs of a world that we expected to 
exist – but  the world was different’...’Disaster research has found that there 
has often been a “failure of foresight” during “the incubation of disasters” 
which has led to man-made disasters. Thus researchers argue that disasters 
occur when there is a divergence between socially constructed expectations 
about nature’s energy and nature’s movements resulting from that energy’ 
(cit. by: Murphy, 2010: 27). 
Thirdly, it has been important to analyze and use the concepts embraced by 
the notion of ‘complex emergences’ (Beck, 1992; Keen, 2008; Murphy, 
2010; Yanitsky, 2000, 2010). Keen, defining the term ‘complex emergences’ 
stresses that they are “linked to internal or external conflict” such as  civil 
wars, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Nevertheless, he wrote that “violent 
conflict and natural disaster  may interact’… ‘Though we are distinguishing 
natural disasters from complex emergences on the ground of absence of 
large-scale conflict, there is always a politics to any disaster, and there will 
be elements of conflict and even out-right coercion in a natural disaster 
(Keen, 2008: 2-3). Nevertheless, the concept applicable to the cases of rather 
complicated biosociotechnical catastrophes with unavoidable ‘boomerang 
effect’ (Beck), that is a specific feed-back defined neither spatially nor sub-
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stantially (the Chrenobyl accident is the best example). Whilst W. Catton 
and R. Dunlap in their New Ecological Paradigm stated that ‘Although the 
inventiveness of humans and power derived there from may seem for a  
while to extend carrying capacity limits, ecological laws cannot be repealed’ 
*(Catton and Dunlap, 1980: 24). R. Murphy went much further stating that 
‘biophysical events undermine assumptions of safety and mastery of nature’ 
(Murphy, 2010: 15). Of a no less important the Keen’s idea that ‘Humanita-
rian aid is habitually based on needs assessments and early warning systems 
that are themselves based on systems of counting – on measurement of 
thinnes, rainfall, production, number of displaced people and so on. Such 
number-based systems may miss most of the important things that are going 
on in a particular society. The danger is that they provide an apparently un-
objectionable, technological screen behind which ethnic manipulation and 
economic exploitation can proceed unhindered. Many of this variables came 
to prominence (становятся очевидными) in relation to natural disasters 
(Keen, 2008: 161). My choice of these concepts (risk society, normal acci-
dent, complex emergences) which form the theoretical pillars of my study of 
the social consequences of the above fires is explained not only by my spe-
cific interest to depict the mobilization state of Russian civil society, but the 
general process of speedy growing instability of the Biosphere which mani-
fests itself in growing number and scale of natural accidents (fires, floods, 
tornados, sharp oscillations of air temperature and/or atmospheric pressure) 
and, what is the most important, its social consequences each of them is 
needed a specific and long-term rehabilitation. As D. Smith argued, ‘today 
fear and anger reasserting themselves. We are moving into an era where 
greed will no longer be central force in out lives. The battle to get more will 
gradually be replaced by the fight to keep what you have, which will, in turn, 
unless things change, gradually become a more basic struggle for survival. 
This struggle is already central for the poor. Sooner or later, some of mid-
dling rich may join them in the same boat’ (Smith, 2008: 347). 
Finally, the character of discourse and rhetoric are critically important for 
our analysis because ‘they result in particular practices that are either benign 
or harmful in human interaction with biophysical dynamics. In particular, 
what the population and leaders define as safe or as risky determines the 
actions that will be taken… Discourse analysis focuses on ‘claims-making’ 
by complaining groups. The key question is “how are claims presented so as 
to persuade their audiences”. For example, how are claims of risk of disaster 
or environmental degradation assembled, presented, and contested? What 
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does the claim come from, who manage it, what resources do they have, and 
what interests do they represent?  Storylines create meaning and mobilize 
action…Consent of the population is internalized by framing the debate in a 
particular way and suppressing opposing framings, which both use and con-
struct (Murphy, 2010: 21-22). 
 
 3. Three phases of a SM mobilization  
The first and the most world-vide phase I call a ‘usual’. It depends on politi-
cal and social opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1988, 2005). In Russia from 
early 1990s onwards, this structure gradually shrank, and finally became 
hostile to the majority of Russian SMs except so called pro-Kremlin SMs. 
Nowadays, these movements exist and used to practice in the hostile political 
context (Yanitsky, 1999, 2010). The second phase of a SM mobilization can 
be labeled as ‘targeted’ or planned when something extra-ordinary already 
happened in a particular place, be it a natural disaster or man-made accident. 
This phase is characterized by mobilization resources at hand plus, if neces-
sary, by the attraction some sister movements or organizations (say, local 
grassroots or charity organizations).  The third phase I call a ‘critical’ (ex-
treme) case when all accessible resources should be mobilized.  
Accordingly, the first case could be labeled as a limited mobilization because 
it presents a particular SM’s response to usual and long-term hostile context 
pressure. A limited mobilization means that the SMOs leaders mobilizes 
resources at hand, that is, the mobilization of any extra-efforts are not 
needed. Their already accumulated knowledge and experience (action reper-
toire) is well enough for coping with the particular accident. 
The second case may be depicted as targeted mobilization of a particular SM 
and his sister organization’s resources for mitigation of a  given disaster. 
And the third case presents all-embraced mobilization of a global civil socie-
ty (or at least of its concerned majority) for coping with the large-scale natu-
ral or man-made catastrophe. Or as it happened quite recently, it presents the 
all-embracing civil society response to a new challenge such as global warm-
ing. In this latter case SMs of various kinds could united in an alter-global 
social movement. 
It is quite natural that whilst in the first phase the process of resources mobi-
lization presents a routine work (gathering information, mapping local re-
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sources, attempts to widen its constituency, etc.), in the latter phase all poss-
ible resources, be it at hand or distanced should be find out and mobilized.  
Besides, I would stress that in all above cases the resources of civil society 
organizations are usually not ‘stored’ and ready to use as in the case of go-
vernmental rescue organizations, but they should be find out or mainly pro-
duced by civic organizations themselves.  These search for or self-
production of resources means the critical change of their habitual way of 
life. First of all it related to established order of man—nature relations. That 
is why, U.Beck said: ‘The hardcore sociological question is: Where is the 
support for ecological changes supposed to come from, the support which in 
many cases would undermine their lifestyles, their consumption habits, their 
social status and life conditions in what are already truly very uncertain 
times?’(Beck, 2010: 2).  
 
4. Framing the issue and changing the sense and structure of a SM  
Though as I mentioned earlier, recently nearly all Russian SMs are in the 
first phase of mobilization, every disaster needs its own set of frames: master 
frame, motivation, mobilization, etc. To my mind, the master frame is the 
same that of worldview or general disposition. It should answer to the key 
question: why we, the SM and its activists and allies, should be mobilized? 
In our case (forest, steppe and peat fires) the master frame is ‘People and 
nature in calamity - they needs our aid!’, Motivation frame: ‘We are needed 
because nobody can help them but ourselves’, Mobilization frames: ‘They 
need help immediately!’ and ‘All who can do it, united!’ Literally speaking, 
the 2010 Summer mobilization can be called as the short-term ‘The Interna-
tional Alliance of Civil Rescuers’, which above all, activates the ‘sleeping’ 
resources and networks of the environmental, charity, local lore and other 
social movements and grassroots.   
It is quite natural that the focal point of all activities of all SMs involved is a 
rescue operations of those who have been affected by a disaster. It was mas-
sive action, but of spot-like and not a protest character. The key limits of 
rescue activity were time and resistance of local residents who did not want 
to leave their long-occupied places. Hence, not a socio-ecological conflict 
become a focal point of a SM’s activity, but a field of required help. It means 
that a SM activity has not defensive of offensive (if not militant), bun huma-
nitarian character. The hot summer of 2010 discrowns the myth cultivated 
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by official media that Russian SMs have predominantly radical character. 
Instead, they showed their constructive and charity potential. 
As I mentioned above, a disaster use to determine character of a SMs activi-
ty. Since the fire (and consequently, the size and margins of the zone of 
emergency) depends of a speed and direction of wind which has been per-
manently changing, the aid network constructed by a SM to help should 
follow the these fluctuations as well. Thus, the first distinguishing feature of 
the structure SM-at-disaster is high mobility and quick change of functions of 
a SM. It SMOs began to function as a station, command post and distributor 
of resources. 
Then, the organizational (logistic) function of a SMOs came fourth. The one 
thing is to organize mass protest campaign, and quire another to govern the 
process of rendering the assistance in right place and due time. This logistic 
function become more complicated since a SM’s activists have to coordinate 
their actions with other actors -- of state rescue commands, on the one hand, 
and with local experts and lay people, on the other. 
I should stress that in mitigation of a disaster consequences local activists 
were both outsiders and insiders that never happened in their struggle with 
state bodies in ‘normal’ cases of mobilization for  nature protection defense. 
In the situation of natural disaster they were forced to be insiders, that is, 
direct participants of fire extinguishing and people rescuing. Otherwise, they 
would be not capable to ‘follow the actor’, i.e. fire’s twists.   
Obviously, the networks was its key function element. In structural terms, 
the system of aid presents a very disperse system of networks and their 
nodes which operate in regime of prompt decisions and permanent switching 
the channels of information and material flows. This case could be seem as 
antithesis to ‘programming and switching’ implemented by media attached 
to power structures (Arsenalt and Castells, 2008: 489-90). And with constant 
feed-back. Three main features of this network should be mentioned. First, it 
was spread far beyond the limits of the SMOs of a particular social move-
ment. Second, the SMOs as such turned into multi-functional command cen-
ters whose main function was to gather, process and disseminate information 
concerning where, what and how urgent the particular aid is needed. Then, 
they organized delivering the asked (inquired) aid to the client’s address, be 
it a person or settlement. So they worked as logistics centers. Thirdly, the 
overall country far beyond the fire areas was dotted with numerous ad hoc 
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civil groups aimed at the giving help to victims of fires. Sometimes these 
groups collaborated with SMOs, sometimes acted independently. The latter 
case is indicative because it is a clear evidence that Russian civil society do 
exist and capable to act independently both from its other units as well as 
from state organizations. Their power was in their capability to be in right 
place and in right time and above all with particular help needed right now. 
 Let us turn to resources as such . If disaster actually happened, which re-
sources the SMs can actually mobilize for coping with a catastrophe? Again, 
resources for nature protection repertoire are different from those needed in 
disaster. Apart from their professional knowledge, their major resource was 
their experience of communication with various organizations of our society: 
power and business structures, other movements, expert groups, sister groups 
abroad, local people, etc. Of course, the rationalism and rational resource 
supply are needed in both cases. Nevertheless, in the protest campaigns ac-
tivists are first of all fighters armed with knowledge of weak and sensitive 
points of their adversaries. In the case of disasters the major roles of activists 
are helpers, assistants who brings to those who suffered the empathy, human 
sympathy, and the feeling that they are not ‘throwaway people’. Above all, 
local civic rescuers be acquainted with local situation and culture were capa-
ble to do much more than the state rescuers. 
As events of hot Summer 2010 showed, the Russian eco-activists fulfill a lot 
of functions. The were creators of particular resource mobilization networks, 
local knowledge finders, it processors and carriers as well as local resource 
mobilizers, managers (distributors), guides, rescuers, volunteers and so on. 
The last but not least. Activists-turned-rescuers mobilized now-how of local 
residents and stimulate their creativity. 
 
5. The role of Internet 
It is now trivial that if someone use an IT networks, he/she is usually capable 
to attract more attention, resources and peoples and make a society more 
concerned. More important that civil self-organized forums and other inter-
net communities worked against the dizorganized force of central media 
whose favorite tactics is to pile one sensation over the other resulted in col-
lage-like perception of the life process by ordinary people. Now, they felt 
that they were not alone, they experienced the feeling of fellowship and re-
ceived the guide what has to be done first. Besides, at the civil self-organized 
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forums an information overloading what are peculiar to official media is 
impossible by definition: Only the necessary information gathered, 
processed and distributed. At such forums any irrelevant information is im-
mediately cut out. An it is quite natural: The aim of information produced by 
forum organizers is to convert passive local residents into active citizens 
within a given community. 
As everywhere, a civil society is much more network structured than the 
state organizations. From 1970s onwards, former the USSR’s Greens were 
the first who became network structured and began to use networks for their 
everyday activity, including protest mobilization. During 2000s the state 
bodies by means of tough legislation, propagation of concurrence, consumer-
ism and individualism suppressed or forced to dissolve thousands of gras-
sroots and civic initiatives. The disaster stimulates the re-emergence many of 
them and creates a lot of new ones on the basis of internet communication. 
Today the internet serves as a great pool of potential resources which could 
be convert into actual ones and mobilized by civil activists independently of 
the state plans or intentions. 
During 20 years previous the issue in question, Russian SMs accumulated a 
great experience in the use of networks for various needs, and first of all for 
accumulating social capital and social technologies (action repertoire). 
Therefore, when fires began, not the official media, but that of the SMOs 
became the building of network structures to gather information about the 
situation in various parts of the country, to mobilize material and human 
resources and distributed them in a targeted way. In some degree in this state 
of emergency the SMOs took in their hands the function of ‘programmers 
and switchers’ which usually is a prerogative of an official media. 
The emerged network structure enrich both concerned parts: scientists and 
experts, on the one hand, and local expert-citizens and lay people, on the 
other hand. May be for the first time, activists and scientists from various 
social groups and value preferences got together to reflect on the issue and 
developed recommendation which were disseminated by the network chan-
nels. It is indicative, that this reflection was more politically and socially 
oriented than purely ecological. The very fact of network mobilization was a 
political phenomenon called U. Beck as ‘sub-politics’. It meant that civil 
rescuers actually took decisions not pretending to get power. Besides, the 
internet communication allowed them to evaluate the size of territory af-
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fected by disaster, estimate material and human losses and compare their 
estimations with that given by officials and its media. 
The civil rescuers revealed which IT instruments more applicable for a par-
ticular cases. For example, internet-forums turned out the most multi-
functional device, especially efficient for rendering targeted aid and informa-
tion exchange between victims and their relatives and friends outside the 
zone of disaster. Whilst twitter has been used for urgent dissemination in-
formation about new hotbeds of defeat. But there is a problem: New infor-
mation is usually embedded in habitual frames. ‘Humans have a strong ten-
dency to make new information conform to existing views’ (Keen, 2008: 
150). For example, if we believe that a fire is always a bad thing, it means 
that we are psychologically predisposed to estimate all its consequences as 
‘bad’. Language is encourages this one-sided estimations, because it tend to 
direct our comprehension of fires in particular direction. That is, humans 
tend to embed this information into their habitual frames (worldviews). 
More general conclusion is that in the future the civil society organizations 
including effective assistance of local administration, being armed with IT 
and having relevant resources, will be capable to cope with a disaster much 
faster and with less losses than the State emergency organizations did it. The 
explanation of this fact is rather simple: the former used networks for multi-
sided contacts to mobilize all possible resources across the country, whereas 
the latter – first of all for their own needs. In other words, there are two 
kinds of mobilization: by free will and ex officio.  
Finally, the internet helps to promote what is usually labeled as alternative 
public sphere that offer a new, empowering sense to lay people of what does 
it means to be a civil activist.  
  
6. Revitalization of civil society (positive effects) 
Since our project targeted to embrace all social phases of the fire disaster 
(from its predicting to final rehabilitation of affected zones) I would like to 
present here preliminary the most obvious positive results and effects of the 
civil mobilization under consideration. 
(1) the map of disposition of forces and timing of the run of catastrophe has 
been revealed and fixed;  
 113 
 
(2) consolidation, self-organization of a large part of Russian civil society 
under the above critical conditions, more tight ties between local communi-
ties and gaining new local knowledge by them. Local programmers and 
switchers of information flows are emerged;  
(3) better mutual understanding and coordination of actions between rescuers 
and local residents has been reached. We observed the rise of self-esteem of 
all involved in the fire extinguishing, because they realized that they saved 
forest and people who lived in or nearby as well;   
(4) all involved acquired new experience. More than that, their participation 
in this dangerous and multisided enterprise was actually a new step in their 
socialization. All involved, including the scholars and scientists, acquired 
better understanding of interrelationships between social order (habit of eve-
ryday life) and nature’s dynamics;  
(5) activists became not only more armed with models of decision-making 
under critical conditions, but more socially and culturally sophisticated as 
well;   
(6) the catastrophe initiated the mobilization of social capital of many people 
far beyond the zone of fires. The constituency of civil rescuers is no doubt 
had expanded. In particular, social capital of professional ecologists and 
local residents has been activated, because they felt that their knowledge and 
practical experience had been claimed; 
(7) new civil centers of resource mobilization and complex analyses of social 
consequences of the disaster both within and beyond the SMOs had been 
emerged. For Russia the emergence new initiative groups using IT in remote 
provinces is critically important. A social memory of local residents (abori-
ginals) being mobilized became an additional resource because aboriginals 
knew how local people fought against the same dizasters  in the past. 
(8) The disaster raised the sensitivity to risk of local population again be-
cause the recent permanent state of ‘usual’ emergency make people get ac-
customed to it. As Murphy put it: ‘When extreme weather triggers a disas-
ter…the population and key leaders attempt to make sense of the new situa-
tion’. It is needed because ‘there is a decay curve of sensitivity to risks and 
hazards by which the increasing time after normality has returned tends to 
lead to the fading away of the acknowledged risk. A major challenge of lea-
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dership consist of preventing this decline from occurring’ (Murphy, 2010: 
243). 
(9) The disaster favored various forms of self-organization. Activists were 
forced to act regardless official instructions, sometimes coming into collision 
with strict instructions of federal forces, that is, of the state rescuers and lo-
cal administration. 
(10) it is indicative that during the struggle with fire and then rendering as-
sistance to injured or psychologically depressed there were no one conflict 
between people of different nationalities. All involved, be it volunteers or 
local residents, worked (and suffered) equally. 
(11) their motivation and at the same time mobilizing frame was ‘we are 
needed!’, that is, their activity was claiming and necessary for others. In 
other words, their collective efforts aimed at the protection of a common 
good were again claimed by the society. 
(12) the most important result of this hot Russian summer was the exposition 
of absolutely useless of the new Forestry Code adopted in 2005 and some 
other laws related to forestry and forestry business in particular. 
(13) looking more widely, we agree with our western partners that ‘the inter-
net is an efficient tool in terms of the diffusion of protest (Della Porta et al., 
1999) and the consistency of protest, in order to achieve a ‘consensual mobi-
lization’ (Olitrault, 2001: 124, quotation from: Win de Donk et al., 2004: 
171).  
 
7. Political and scientific and institutions 
Surprisingly, but the critical situation under review had for a long time no 
any response from the part of central, regional and local authorities. Fires 
quickly expanded, smog covered Moscow, its residents suffocated, but it 
seemed that politicians of all levels and ranks have heard nothing about all 
this including the President’s administration and former Moscow mayor. No 
measures were taken in order to alleviate the sufferings of sick and old. The 
situation were worse than in New Orleans. Nevertheless, official media re-
ported that ‘All under control’. There are some explanations of this aliena-
tion, but the key of them meant that it was one more confirmation that power 
incapsulated and did not want to show its interest to lay people’s fatigue 
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even in critical circumstances. All warnings made in advance by research 
institutes and monitoring organizations were disregarded.  Besides alienation 
mentioned above, there is one more explanation of weakness of power. ‘Or-
ganizations that had been rational and efficient under normal dynamics of 
nature were now having great  difficulty coping with its extreme movements. 
The severe weather exposed modern society as fragile. Previously, nature 
has seemed reduced to benign recreation, but now it appeared threatening 
and filled with danger’. (Murphy, 2010: 88-89). Only some king of busi-
nesses celebrated because the prices for all could make cool – ventilators, 
conditioners, sun-screens and the like – jumping up every day. 
As to academics, they divided in two parts. A majority of professors and 
instructors of high schools (with their children and relatives) simply run 
away from zones of fire and smog, and calmly continued their relaxation 
abroad. Only by the command from the top some of them as well as regional 
and local executives were forced to return to suffering cities and towns. On 
the contrary, the minority of academics, mainly involved in nature protec-
tion, took part in aid and rescue operations at once. They worked not only as 
consultants or experts, but did any rescue work which was needed in a par-
ticular place. As I confirmed empirically, the old tradition of Russian scien-
tists khozdenie v narod  (going to people) had been revitalized (Yanitsky, 
2005). But there is another explanation of their activity: many of them had 
bought dachas (shale) in devastated rural villages, and therefore they de-
fended from fires not only a common good but their private property. 
 
8. On shortcomings of rescue operations 
Since we, sociologists, had been insiders and practiced bottom—up view, 
some deficits and mistakes of official organizations responsible for rescue 
became clearly seen. Firstly, the impact on political and economic processes 
underline a disaster had been not investigated (for example, a local adminis-
tration functions or building materials). Rescue organizers first looking at the 
aid operation itself. Then, the rescuers has no a rehabilitation program. Their 
operations were restricted by prevention fire of houses of local inhabitants, 
only. There were no programs of their further security, food supply, etc. 
They did not know the state of art of targeted population before the begin-
ning of disaster and aid intervention. Neither municipal authorities nor res-
cuers did not know how many people were actually needed in aid and medi-
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cal help, because some of residents left their homes before fire. It may be 
said that the state bodies have no models and the least idea on the forthcom-
ing disaster, its scope, timing, pace, probable character of damages as well as 
on how to cope with it.   
Furthermore, the authorities has no idea what must be done (secured) first of 
all and what  can wait till Spring (Summer, etc). Then it is a problem of neg-
lecting long-term effect of disaster. Rescues returned to their barracks and 
who will plan and implement of people, settlement and nature rehabilitation? 
I share the view of Keen that  not consulting of end-user is a serious prob-
lem. The voice of victims only rare comes through the evaluations made by 
officials. Calling victims or end-users ‘beneficiaries’ tends to pre-empt the 
crucial question or whether they have indeed benefited. 
The next common failing in evaluations of a disaster consequences is that the 
sociologists and rescuers, being outsiders, not asking relevant questions to 
victims of disaster. For example, they were usually never asked about plans 
on their immediate and more distant future. As our investigation showed the 
situation is 50: 50. One half has no plan to resettle, the other dreams to leave 
their settlement for ever. 
I agree with Keen that problems of timing is very acute. Insofar as evalua-
tions are carried out  at the end of the project (whether this is development or 
relief), there will be few opportunities for putting right problems as they 
arise. The temptation is for donors to take minimal responsibility for imple-
mentation a complicated set of rehabilitation measures. Donors prefer simply 
to decide at the end of a rescue operation ‘whether the implementing partners 
performed well or badly. And the final related problem centers on who is 
evaluating whom. Some aid workers have stressed that  a proper evaluation 
should be a “two-way street”: there should be opportunities for recipients to 
evaluate donors as well as the other way round.’ (Keen, 2008: 158-9). Do-
nors and rescue organization welcomed to use resources of local people, but 
never involved them in planning of rescue operations and their evaluations. 
 
9. Conclusions  
 Biophysical ‘events undermine assumptions of safety and mastery of nature’ 
(Murphy, 2010: 15). Nature defined the rescue structure of civil rescuers 
activities and stimulates the emergence of multiple ‘spots’ of activity far 
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beyond the SM’s networks. At the same time, the catastrophe have made 
selection within the environmental and other SMs (active participants, wish-
ful participants and by-standers). 
The catastrophe stimulated the dialogue between scientists and local people 
as well as inside the scientific community. There is no doubt that after the 
above events they are both became more politically oriented. It appears that 
discourse and rhetoric are critically important because they result in particu-
lar practices that are either pro-ecological or harmful in human interaction 
with biophysical dynamics. In particular, how the local population and lead-
ers of rescue teams define particular situation as safe or as risky determines 
the actions that will be taken by civil society activists. Discourse is another 
key component in shaping practices, because winning wrong rhetoric leads 
to disastrous consequences. Discourse analysis focuses on ‘claims-making’ 
by complaining groups. 
 The overall cumulative social effect of this Summer catastrophe ha been the 
recognition that the social order in the country, and of the New Forestry code 
(2005) in particular are harmful both for Russian society and its nature. Be-
sides, the actual behavior of the state organizations responsible for prevent-
ing such catastrophe gave raise to protest and mobilization moods (claims). 
In activation of Russian civil society the IT had played the key role. SM’s 
activists and associated volunteers rendered the assistance in mitigation of 
disaster by the creation of the internet-forums which carried out a multiple 
functions: social (creation of groups which were capable to render material 
and medical help), material, psychological aid, logistics, etc, but science is 
just one of many competing forces in the public arena; 
It should be stressed that though for the first time the evidences of local eye-
witnesses were collected, processed and submitted to the federal govern-
ment, unfortunately with no constructive response up to now, their self-
organization had emerged and extinguish so speedy that sociologists could 
not follow them to fix their activity accurately and in full. Nevertheless, 
these internet-forums allowed to local people to compare information about 
the catastrophe given by the state media with what they have seen as eye-
witnesses. This comparison declined the trust in these media and raise the 
trust to the civil society forums, accounts, reports, etc. 
The participants of the mitigation of the consequences of the catastrophe 
were clearly divided in two parts: those who work in epicenter of it, and 
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those who act in a distance. But they were not by-standers and did not avoid 
the participation in rescue operations. On the contrary, they had played the 
important role as the core organizers joining people by means of internet-
forums and blogs, searching various specialists urgently needed in a situ and 
distributing the material aid, garments, medicine, etc. gathered by volunteers 
and ordinary people; Internet and other IT devises became for grassroots a 
powerful means for self-organization. It turned out that internet plus mobile 
phone-set are powerful means for information and self-organization, irres-
pectively to the state command and its intricate and often contradictory in-
structions. Direct communication between civil rescuers and suffering local 
people have begun to rehabilitate the trust between scientists and local 
people, between residents of capital cities and of small towns in province. 
There were a third very small group who consider their participation in dis-
aster mitigation as a kind of extreme tourism or a means of getting an addi-
tional portion of adrenaline.  
 All in all, I call this particular mobilization as ecological because of its inte-
grative and multifunctional character with not definite margins, whereas the 
aid rendered by state’s emergency rescuers has operated in instructive, one-
sided and time-limited way. State rescuers has a definite set of responsibili-
ties and zones defined by their instructions, whereas civil activists felt them-
selves responsible for all related to fire and its victims.  
Summer fires in provinces and Autumn street disturbances of football-fans in 
Moscow finally defined the preferences of power bodies: they like fans and 
dislike environmentalists and defenders of  human rights It is indicative that 
some fun organization called themselves ’Opora’, that means the support of 
existing regime. It turned out that not all dwellers of small towns and large 
cities were infected by individualism and consumerism. Nevertheless, it 
would be wrong to say that civil society organizations are ‘always better’ in 
coping with the disasters than the state ones. ‘For NGOs, accountability is 
often upwards to donors than downwards to beneficiaries. In large part be-
cause of a concern to attract future funding. NGOs and UN agencies typical-
ly put a positive gloss on the impact of their own operations’ (Keen, 2008: 
157).    
In the final analysis, the set of natural disasters in Summer 2010 mobilized 
Russian civil society, made it more stronger and well organized, attracted to 
them more resources as well as backers and sympathizers, and showed to the 
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state officials that in some cases civil organizations were more efficient that 
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